The essays in this volume develop the ideas of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, leading to an explication of the fundamental concepts of logic - the concepts of `judgment', `truth' and the modalities. It is a book on philosophy of logic, spanning the gap between Kant and Hegel on the one hand, and Husserl, Frege and Lask on the other, mediated by such thinkers as Heidegger and König. With the rejection of psychologism, logic is to be construed as concerned with meanings, meanings are to be tied nevertheless to intentional acts of thinking, truth becomes a coherence-theoretical reconstruction of correspondence and, in their origin, modalities are connected to the horizontal character of experience. At one end, logic develops, through formal and transcendental logics, to speculative logic. At the other end, pursuing the practical roots of thinking, it becomes hermeneutic logic. Then we begin to see the nature of logic as a whole. Audience::Philosophers and logicians, both graduate and post-graduate.