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Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of action

Autor G. F. Schueler

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of action
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"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (H...

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  • Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • ISBN13 9780199250370
  • ISBN10 0199250375
  • Tipo LIBRO
  • Páginas 174
  • Año de Edición 2003
  • Idioma Inglés
  • Encuadernación Tela

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Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of action

Autor G. F. Schueler

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (H...

58,15€
No disponible, consulte disponibilidad
Envío gratis
España peninsular

Detalles del libro

"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do." G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.

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