Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Basic animal knowledge is supplemented by a level of reflective knowledge focused on judgment, and a level of 'knowing full well' that is distinctive of the animal that is rational.

Introduction
Part I: Virtue Epistemology Extended and Unified 
1. The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge
2. Virtue Epistemology: Character versus Competence
Part II: A Better Virtue Epistemology 
3. Judgment and Agency
4. A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed
5. Objections and Replies, with a Methodological Afterthought
Part III: Knowledge and Agency 
6. Knowledge and Action
7. Intentional Action and Judgment
8. Social Roots of Human Knowledge
9. Epistemic Agency
Part IV: Historical Antecedents 
10. Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency
11. Descartes' Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University, New Jersey

Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.