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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

Autor Stephen Finlay

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language
32,00€
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  • Verlag OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • ISBN13 9780190649630
  • ISBN10 0190649631
  • Gegenstandsart Buch
  • Buchseiten 288
  • Sammlung Oxford Moral Theory #
  • Jahr der Ausgabe 2016
  • Sprache Englisch
  • Bindung Taschenbuch

Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

Autor Stephen Finlay

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

32,00€
Nicht verfügbar, verfügbarkeit bestätigen
Kostenloser Versand
Festland Spanien
KOSTENLOSER Versand ab 19 €

zum spanischen Festland

Versand in 24/48 Stunden

5% Rabatt auf alle Bücher

Kostenlose Abholung in der Buchhandlung

Komm und lass dich überraschen!

Buch Details

This is one of the richest, most sophisticated, and most impressive books on metaethics to have been published in my lifetime. Everyone with any interest in normative language ought to read it. Those who would seek to defend reductive naturalist views of the sort Finlay develops here will find it a treasure trove of dialectical resources that they will want to plunder repeatedly. Those who seek to attack such views or to defend rival views will find it a challenge it would be shameful to ignore. (James Lenman, LANGUAGE)

Stephen Finlay has made an indispensable contribution to our understanding of normative, evaluative, and moral language...his broadly relativist approach offers an intellectually appealing alternative (The Philosophers' Magazine)

This is a book that anyone with an interest in metaethics ought to read, and I recommend it very highly. (Analysis)

Stephen Finlay's Confusion of Tongues (COT) is an ambitious book. Its first half advances a unifying semantics for normative words, including 'good', 'ought', and 'reason'. In the second half, he argues that this semantics, combined with a single pragmatic principle, can explain the uses of such expressions of special interest to ethicists. COT's engagement with these topics is rich and complex. (Mind)