On August 14, 1942, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower Commander of the European theater of operations for North Africa. Eisenhower had no prior training or experience in warfare and no experience commanding an army. Frequently, he was subjected to unjustifiable interference from Marshal (who was 3,000 miles away from the fighting).

This book explores the idea that both Eisenhower and Marshall made too many decisions which were based not on sound military principles, but rather on nationalism and well-intended generosity. Beginning with his appointment and the planning of the invasion of North Africa, this work suggests that Eisenhower's involvement in political situations weakened his effectiveness on the battlefield. Topics of particular focus include Eisenhower's inconsistencies in planning the invasion of Sicily, the much-disputed "DRAGOON " operation, and Eisenhower's insistence on " broad front " warfare and resistance to the idea of indirect attack. The text provides detailed insight into the rationale-both sound and questionable-behind many of Eisenhower's strategic decisions and suggests that with more experienced leadership, the war could have ended much sooner and with fewer casualties.